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Abstract
This paper describes a fail-safe design approach that
can be used to achieve a high level of fail-safety with
conventional computing equipment which may con-
tain design aws. The method is based on the well-
established concept of \reversible computing".
Conventional programs destroy information and
hence cannot be reversed. However it is easy to de-
ne a virtual machine that preserves sucient inter-
mediate information to permit reversal. Any program
implemented on this virtual machine is inherently re-
versible. The integrity of a calculation can therefore be
checked by reversing back from the output values and
checking for the equivalence of intermediate values and
original input values. By using dierent machine in-
structions on the forward and reverse paths, errors in
any single instruction execution can be revealed. Ran-
dom corruptions in data values are also detected.
An assessment of the performance of the reversible
computer design for a simple reactor trip application
indicates that it runs about ten times slower than a con-
ventional software implementation and requires about
20 kilobytes of additional storage. The trials also show
a fail-safe bias of better than 99.998% for random data
corruptions, and it is argued that failures due to sys-
tematic aws could achieve similar levels of fail-safe
bias. Potential extensions and applications of the tech-
nique are discussed.
1. Introduction
Most practical computer-based safety systems rely
on commercial hardware, such as processor chips, and
supporting software, like compilers. These components
have not been veried in any formal sense, and any in-
herent aws could aect the system behaviour in un-
predictable ways. A stronger safety case can be made if
a fail-safe behaviour can be imposed on this \untrusted
base".
In this paper we describe a novel approach to fail-
safe design which is based on the concept of \reversible
computing". We will describe the reversible computing
concept, the implementation of the fail-safe design, and
an evaluation of the performance of the technique when
applied to a simple reactor trip application. In the
nal sections we discuss the practical applications of
this technique and further areas of work.
2. Reversible computing
Early pioneers in the eld of computing like Tur-
ing and Von Neumann examined the minimum energy
needed for computation and concluded that each ele-
mentary operation would require an energy expendi-
ture of at least kT ln 2 where k is the Boltzmann con-
stant and T is the absolute temperature. The argu-
ment here is that kT represents the background en-
ergy (Brownian motion) and any operation must ex-
ceed this to be distinguishable from the background
noise. This theory was subsequently overturned by
Landauer [7, 8] who showed that this was only true
if the process was irreversible. If you could perform
the computation, save the result and then reverse the
computation to get the original inputs, no energy need
be consumed (except for retaining the answer). Ba-
sically normal computation increases disorder (i.e. en-
tropy) and is irreversible, but a reversible design does
not increase disorder (the reverse action acts like a re-
frigerator). This fundamental concept was further de-
veloped by Bennett [1, 2, 3] who showed it was possible
to construct a modied form of Turing machine which
was reversible, and hence that any computation is po-
tentially reversible. In a later development Fredkin [6]
showed that it was possible to construct a \conserva-
tive logic gate" which was reversible but could be used
to construct conventional AND and OR functions, so
there is a general mechanism for constructing reversible
logic circuits. These concepts have been used to min-
imise the heat dissipation in logic circuits [9, 5].
In our paper we have used the reversible comput-
ing concept to implement a novel form of self-checking
which can be applied at the software level rather than
the circuit level. The reversible computing concept can
be illustrated by the following simple example. The
\+" function maps the number pair < 1; 3 > to a
single value < 4 >. It is not possible to reverse this
because this output value can be computed from sev-
eral distinct input pairs (e.g. < 0; 4 >, < 1; 3 > or
< 2; 2 >). In a reversible computation the mapping is
bi-directional (i.e. a one to one mapping). This can be
achieved by generating \garbage data" as well as the
required result. For example we could dene a modi-
ed function (PLUS) that produces the required result
together with one of the input operands (e.g. < 1; 3 >
maps to < 4; 1 > where the second value is \garbage
data"). The unknown input value (3) can be regener-
ated by subtracting the garbage data from the sum.
All the basic computing functions can be modied
to generate the necessary garbage data to make them
reversible. A conventional computing function can be
represented as
y = f(x)
but a reversible function typically has the form:
< y; g >= f
r
(x)
The function f
r
(x) produces the same y value as f(x)
but also produces the \garbage data" g required for
reversal. There is an associated inverse function f
 1
r
that uses the garbage data and computed value to re-
generate the input values:
x = f
 1
r
(y; g)
The behaviour of a reversible function is illustrated in
Figure 1.
Providing the garbage data is saved, a program
constructed from a sequence of reversible functions is
also a reversible function. This suggests that the re-
versible computing concept could be used to imple-
ment a powerful and general form of fault detection.
If a reversible computer function f
r
(x) and its inverse
function f
 1
r
(y; g) are correctly implemented, then we
would expect that:
x = f
 1
r
(f
r
(x))
would hold for any program execution. In other words,
by reversing the computation and getting the original
input values, we have greater condence that the com-
puted value y is correct. If the forward and reverse
set of possible
input values (x)
fr(x)
x
g y
garbage
values
computed
result (y)
fr-1(y,g)
x
mapping back to
input values
Figure 1. Illustration of reversible computing
functions are diversely implemented, this should guard
against systematic faults in the underlying \machine"
(e.g. due to faulty software tools or hardware design
aws like the Pentium divide bug). If the aw exists
in one direction only, the failure should always be de-
tected by a mismatched value. If failures can occur in
both directions, it is dicult to calculate the detection
probability, but both functions have to fail simultane-
ously and agree on the same wrong result. To be per-
manently undetected they have to agree on the same
wrong answer for all error-inducing values of x.
The mechanism should also detect typical random
data corruption faults that aect any data value used
in the computation. It can also guard against simple
application programming errors which result in nite
precision overow and underow since the reverse com-
putation will not be identical.
Reverse computing can be regarded as a form of low-
level design diversity which does not suer the usual
problems of diversity (such as consistency checking and
voting). It also has the advantage that the set of re-
versible instructions (the reversible \virtual machine")
only needs to be implemented once, and it can then
support many dierent applications. If an application
is formally proved down to the fail-safe \virtual ma-
chine" level, a strong argument for the complete im-
plementation can be made.
Set against this there are a number of disadvan-
tages. It will be slower, use extra memory storage
and may not be appropriate for all computations (es-
pecially oating point). With existing oating point
hardware it is not possible to dene an exact inverse
due to round-o problems. For many safety applica-
tions however, relatively slow computations using inte-
gers are sucient to implement a safety function, and
this is the focus of the current work.
3. A prototype reversible computer
In order to evaluate the approach a simple reversible
instruction set, called ARC (A Reversible Computer),
has been implemented. A prototype of the reversible
instruction set has been implemented in Forth. This
language was chosen because it is readily extensible so
that reversible operators can be dened in the language
and then intermixed with existing Forth instructions
(e.g. for declaring and accessing data variables, or run-
ning tests). It is also an interactive language so that
the new functions can be rapidly tested and debugged.
The interactive capability can also be used to inject
faults interactively into the \virtual machine" to check
its fault detection capability. The language is not opti-
mal in terms of speed, but once the basic concepts have
been established it is relatively easy to re-implement
the virtual machine using C or even assembler code.
A brief outline of the Forth language will be given,
followed by a description of the design of the reversible
virtual machine.
3.1. The Forth language
Forth is rather unusual because it is a stack-oriented
language which uses Reverse Polish Notation (RPN).
This method is used on some calculators; values are
put on the stack then evaluated with an operator and
the result is put back on the stack. For example an
expression such as:
2 + 30 / 5
is represented in Forth as:
2 30 5 / +
Reference to a variable (e.g. X) places a memory ad-
dress on the stack, and an explicit operation is needed
to extract the value, so to add two variables X and Y
the following code is used:
X @ Y @ +
where @ is the \load" operator that extracts a value
from a memory location. Additional operators can be
dened which take their arguments from the stack and
return the result(s) on the stack. For example the op-
erator INCREMENT could be dened as follows:
: increment
1 +
;
Once dened, this function can be treated like a built-
in operator, e.g.: the sequence:
2 increment
will leave the value 3 on the stack. The language con-
tains no GOTO instructions. Conditional statements,
while loop and xed loop constructs are provided in
the language. Enhanced versions of these control con-
structs can be dened as new operators.
3.2. Design of the reversible virtual ma-
chine
In any reversible computer design, it is essential to
store the garbage data. In Bennett's original work on
reversible computing [1], a reversible Turing machine
was implemented using an additional \tape" to hold
the garbage data. The ARC design uses a similar ap-
proach (although the \tape" is actually an array im-
plemented in main memory). During forward execu-
tion, garbage data is appended to the tape. When the
execution is reversed, the tape is \wound back" when-
ever a reverse instruction consumes a garbage value.
The tape should be fully rewound when the program
has been fully reversed. The second design issue is
how we represent the forward and reverse versions of
the program. In some proposed hardware designs [10],
only the forward version of the program is required and
the direction of execution is reversed when the end is
reached. On the reverse path, the instruction is inter-
preted dierently so that it performs the reverse com-
putational function. This approach is space-ecient
as the program is no larger than a conventional non-
reversible program, but it is dicult to implement in
software.
We examined two alternative approaches for repre-
senting the program and its inverse. In the rst de-
sign, each forward instruction places the address of
its matching reverse function on an additional \com-
mand tape" (e.g. PLUS would store a REVPLUS op-
erator on the command tape). When the forward ex-
ecution is completed, reversal can be performed by a
REVERSE operator which reads and executes the in-
structions from the command tape. Execution of these
commands will also consume data from the data tape,
so both tapes should be fully rewound when the rever-
sal is complete. In the second design, the command
tape is eliminated and a second \reverse program" has
to be written which is a mirror image of the forward
program, e.g. a program such as:
Y:= X + 1
would be represented by the following sequence of ARC
instructions (which are described in more detail later):
X LOAD
1 REF
PLUS
Y STORE
The program to reverse this computation can be cre-
ated by a sequence of matching REV commands writ-
ten in the reverse order
Y REVSTORE
REVPLUS
1 REVREF
X REVLOAD
A STORE instruction destroys the original memory
contents so the prior value is saved on the data tape.
The matchingREVSTORE command restores the orig-
inal memory contents. The LOAD does not destroy
data, but the REVLOAD is an essential command be-
cause it checks that the \uncomputed" value on the
stack matches the one stored in memory. Thus the
REVLOAD command automatically checks that the
reverse computation matches the original input value.
The REF{REVREF pair performs a similar check on
program constants.
Both designs have similar reverse programs, in
the rst case it is created on the command tape,
while in the second case it is an explicit pro-
gram. The main dierence is that the command
tape version represents a particular \thread" through
the program, so reverse IFTHEN. . .ELSE. . .ENDIF
structures are not needed. In the \mirror pro-
gram" design, the IFTHEN. . .ENDIF structures have
to record which path was executed on the data
tape. This information is used by a match-
ing REVENDIF. . .REVELSE. . .REVIFTHEN struc-
ture to determine which portion of the code should be
executed in the reverse program. Loop iteration counts
are stored in a similar way, so that the correct number
of reverse iterations are performed.
The main problem with the command tape concept
is the amount of storage required for long computa-
tions. Since the \tapes" are implemented as arrays in
memory, space is limited. The \mirror program" de-
sign requires less dynamic memory as there is no \com-
mand tape". In addition, less information needs to be
stored on the data tape (such as the memory location
for a REVSTORE instruction) as this information is
provided by the mirror program.
In practice, either design would be adequate for
a simple safety application, and \tape exhaustion"
should not occur provided the maximum usage of the
tape can be determined in advance. The nite tape
length could even be regarded as an advantage in a
real-time system because exhaustion of the tape could
be designed to enforce a timing constraint and the sys-
tem could be designed to be fail-safe if tape exhaustion
was detected.
3.3. The ARC machine instructions
The ARC machine instructions are relatively lim-
ited but, coupled with some \raw" Forth instructions
for data declarations, they are sucient to perform
reasonably complex calculations. The ARC instruc-
tions are stack-oriented and this makes it very easy to
convert high level language expressions into equivalent
ARC instructions. Many language translators convert
the input into an intermediate Reverse Polish format
before generating the machine code, so there is virtu-
ally a one-to-one equivalence between the RPN format
and equivalent ARC instructions.
All operators use 32 bit integers and include:
memory access operators { LOAD, STORE, REF,
LOADINDEX, STOREINDEX; arithmetic operators
{ PLUS, MINUS, INC, DEC, TIMES, DIV, MAXX,
MINN; comparison operators { GT, EQ, NE, LT;
boolean operators { ANDD, ORR, XORR, NOTT (the
rather odd mnemonics in this list were chosen to avoid
existing Forth operators). Each command has a \mir-
ror" command with a \REV" prex (e.g. PLUS and
REVPLUS).
Modied versions of the standard Forth operators
were used for conditional commands and iteration. The
changes were made to ensure the chosen branch is
recorded on the tape so that the correct block of code
is executed when it is reversed. The ow control com-
mands are:
Conditional execution with an optional ELSE
clause:
<bool> IFTHEN
<true list>
ELSE
<false list>
ENDIF
An iterative loop command:
<nloops> DOLOOP
<loopbody>
ENDLOOP
and an innite loop command:
BEGIN
<loopbody>
AGAIN
Loop counters are computed explicitly using the re-
versible instructions (e.g. INC), so that reversing
through loops is possible. Standard Forth commands
are used to declare the required variables, i.e.:
n CONSTANT x
gives a constant n the symbolic name x;
VARIABLE y
declares variable y (a 32 bit integer); and
CREATE x n CELLS ALLOT
declares an array x with n integer cells (indexed from
zero).
To be useful in a real-time context, we also need
plant input-output commands such as GETAN, GET-
DIG, PUTAN and PUTDIG. These have not been im-
plemented in the experimental version.
3.4. Implementation
The commands are relatively easy to implement, as
shown in the following implementation of the PLUS
operator. The forward command is:
: PLUS
dup pshtape +
;
and the reverse command is:
: REVPLUS
poptape tuck - swap
;
In the PLUS operation, the \dup" command duplicates
the top of the stack, the \pshtape" command transfers
it to the data tape; and \+" sums the next two values
and leaves the result on the stack.
In the REVPLUS operation one of the original
operands is retrieved from the tape using \poptape";
the \tuck" command places a copy of it behind the
second item on the stack (i.e. z, y becomes: y, z, y).
The two top items on the stack are subtracted ( ), and
the \swap" ensures the top two items on the stack (the
original operands) are in the right order.
The concept can be re-implemented in any computer
language. An implementation in C could for example
use in-line procedures or macros, and pass the input
and output values through procedure arguments, e.g.:
void PLUS( int x, y, *z )
{ pushtape( y );
*z = x + y;
};
void REVPLUS( int z, *x, *y)
{
*y = poptape( );
*x = z - *y;
};
3.5. Reversing the computation
With the \mirror program" model, an explicit re-
verse program must be written. This is executed after
the forward program. The mirror program can be im-
plemented by hand, but it is relatively simple to gen-
erate the mirror program automatically.
With the \command tape" model, the forward com-
mands also store the command \thread" required for
reversal. For example, the PLUS command stores the
address of REVPLUS on the command tape. An ad-
ditional command, REVERSE, is required which reads
the command tape and executes the stored command
thread in the reverse order.
In both designs there is an INIT command which
resets any tape to its start position. This should only
be invoked at program start-up. Failure to rewind the
tape completely on reversal indicates that some error
has occurred.
4. Evaluation of the ARC virtual ma-
chine
4.1. The trip application
Once developed, the ARC virtual machine was used
to implement a relatively simple trip application, where
a trip is initiated if any temperature reading exceeds
some upper limit. In reality, temperature measurement
values would be obtained from an analogue interface,
and the trip result would be sent to a digital interface.
In the trial application however, the measured temper-
atures are assumed to be stored in an array (TLIST)
and the trip results stored in another array (RESLIST).
The ARC trip program is shown below:
\ Loop index variable
VARIABLE X
\ Number of temperature A/D inputs
500 CONSTANT #TCS
\ A/D offset equivalent to 4 mA
917 CONSTANT #OFFSET
\ A/D full scale equivalent to 20 mA
4096 CONSTANT #SCALED
\ Full scale temp (degrees)
600 CONSTANT #SCALEM
\ Max Temp in channel ( degrees )
300 CONSTANT #TLIM
\ Input temperature array (mA)
CREATE TLIST #TCS cells allot
\ Trip decision array (per input)
CREATE RESLIST #TCS cells allot
\ ______ TRIPFUNC ______
\
\ TRIP Function pseudo code
\ X:=0
\ DO X=0, #TCS-1
\ IF ( (TLIST[X] - OFFSET)
\ * SCALEM / SCALED ) > TLIM )
\ THEN
\ RESLIST[X]:=1:
\ ELSE
\ RESLIST[X]:=0
\ ENDIF
\ X:= X + 1
\ ENDDO
\ Begin TRIP Function definition
: TRIPFUNC
0 REF
X STORE
#TCS REF DOLOOP
X LOAD
TLIST LOADINDEX
#OFFSET REF
MINUS
#SCALEM REF
TIMES
#SCALED REF
DIV
#TLIM REF
GT
IFTHEN
1 REF
X LOAD
RESLIST STOREINDEX
ELSE
0 REF
X LOAD
RESLIST STOREINDEX
ENDIF
X INC
ENDLOOP
;
\ End of TRIPFUNC definition
This is the basic trip function, and it can be tested
interactively by changing values in TLIST and then
inspecting the results in RESLIST. In a real application
the trip function would be executed in an innite loop,
followed by the reverse program, e.g.:
INIT \initialise tape
BEGIN
TRIPFUNC
REVTRIPFUNC
AGAIN
The BEGIN. . .AGAIN operators are standard Forth
commands that implement an innite loop.
This is the \mirror program" form where a specic
reverse program has to be written. In the \command
tape" form, REVTRIPFUNC would be replaced by a
generic REVERSE function which reverses the com-
mands stored on the command tape. While the use of
REVERSE avoids the need for a specic mirror pro-
gram, a mirror program does provide an additional
on-line program integrity check (since corruptions or
systematic errors in either the forward program or the
mirror program will be detectable on reversal).
4.2. Integration with other integrity checks
The program can integrated with other integrity
checks. Firstly, the program can be tied to a hard-
ware watchdog where alternating signals are sent on
the completion of the forward and reverse paths. For
example TICK and TOCK functions could be imple-
mented that send alternate signal values to the watch-
dog hardware. If the reversal fails, the watchdog will
trip out.
After each reversal, all variables (including
RESLIST) will be restored to their original values. An
independent check can be incorporated after reversal to
check that the program variables match some specic
pattern. For example each variable could have an ini-
tial value set by PRESET-WORK-VARIABLES which
reects its location in memory. After reversal the vari-
ables can be checked by CHECK-WORK-VARIABLES
to check that the initial pattern of values is still present.
We can also exploit our knowledge about the data
tape. The tape region might be corrupted by in-
valid data assignment operations. To check the in-
tegrity of the tape operation we can maintain a sum-
check which can be checked by a special CHECK-
TAPE-INTEGRITY function prior to reversal. We
also know that the tape should be fully rewound, so
this can be checked after reversal (e.g. by CHECK-
TAPE-REWOUND). So the overall program structure
would be:
PRESET-WORK-VARIABLES
INIT
BEGIN
TRIPFUNC
CHECK-TAPE-INTEGRITY
TICK
REVTRIPFUNC
CHECK-TAPE-REWOUND
CHECK-WORK-VARIABLES
TOCK
AGAIN
Note that further run-time checks are incorporated into
the basic ARC instructions to detect tape exhaustion
during the forward and reverse executions of the pro-
gram.
4.3. Storage requirements and timing
To evaluate the overall performance and overheads
of the dierent methods, some comparative tests were
performed using the two dierent reversible methods,
and a \direct" implementation which is non-reversible.
For a 500 channel trip function, run on a 90 MHz Intel
Pentium, the storage requirements and execution times
shown in Table 1 were obtained.
Version Tape Used Time
(kilobytes) (millisecs)
Command tape 120 504
Mirror program 20 102
Non-reversible n/a 10
Table 1. Reversible computing performance
The storage requirements are quite high for the
\command tape" version, mainly because the reverse
instructions are stored on an additional command tape
and this increases for every DOLOOP iteration. Ma-
jor storage savings could be achieved by reversing each
channel computation individually.
All the execution times appear to be adequate for
simple safety applications where input/output execu-
tion times could well be the dominant factor (e.g. up to
20 milliseconds for an analogue measurement). How-
ever, it should be noted that the execution times could
increase by a factor of 10 for a slower processor (such
as an Intel 80386).
It can also be seen that the \command tape" version
is about ve times slower than the \mirror program"
version, which in turn is about ten times slower than
a direct implementation. Similar ratios might be ex-
pected if the ARC virtual machine was implemented
in other languages and processors. With an optimised
ARC virtual machine (e.g. implemented in C or assem-
bler) an Intel 80386 processor might be able to execute
the TRIPFUNC program and its reverse in about the
same time as the Forth version on a Pentium (i.e. 0.1
seconds). This would leave plenty of spare capacity for
more complex real-time applications.
4.4. Response to data corruption
Random data corruption can be catered for by spe-
cic hardware checks (such as memory parity checks)
and by using redundancy. However data can also be
corrupted by aws in program data ows (e.g. due to
errors in the compiler, linker or the processor), and
these are potentially more dangerous as they can cause
failures in redundant channels. In order to test the
response to data corruption, some interactive func-
tions were implemented which could corrupt the val-
ues on the tape, and the main program variables (the
RESLIST and TLIST arrays). After executing TRIP-
FUNC, a data location was corrupted and then the ex-
ecution was reversed. A simple test environment was
constructed to automate this process, and 1000 random
corruption tests were applied to:
 the input values
 the result values
 the data \tape"
For all 3000 tests it was found that all the inserted cor-
ruptions were detected by the checks. This is hardly
surprising, as the REVLOAD, REVREF and tape in-
tegrity checks should nd any single instance of corrup-
tion. Compensating multiple corruptions are a possi-
bility, but these are likely to be low probability events.
4.5. Response to computation aws
It is dicult to estimate the detection probability of
computational aws in operators like PLUS or TIMES
because it is hard to establish the behaviour of an un-
known fault. To get a rough estimate of the likely
detection probability, the detection performance was
measured using a corrupted data tape but removing
the tape integrity check. The rationale behind this as-
sessment is that a aw in a computation function will
result in some discrepancy between the main computed
values and the garbage values on the data tape. The
reverse computing functions should detect these if they
occur. The responses of the reverse computing opera-
tion to 1000 random corruptions of the data tape are
shown in Table 2, together with the integrity check that
identied the fault.
Detection method Number
detected
Percent
detected
REVREF check 518 51.8
REVLOAD check 204 20.4
Boolean value check 139 13.9
CHECK-WORK-VARS 76 7.6
Comparison (REVGT, etc.) 33 3.3
Total 970 97.0
Table 2. Initial fault detection performance
Around 97% of the corruptions were detected.
The REVLOAD, REVREF and preset variable checks
found around 80% of the injected errors. These are
the direct result of uncomputing from the output val-
ues to the input values. The boolean and comparison
checks are intermediate checks (e.g. for legal boolean
values, correct operation of AND, OR, etc.). A closer
inspection was made of the remaining 3% of undetected
errors, and it was found that the TIMES / REVTIMES
pair was the major culprit. The lack of detection can
be explained as follows. On the forward path the re-
sult is computed and one of the operands is put on the
tape, e.g. 5 1001 produces the result 5005 and one of
the operands, e.g. 1001, is stored on the tape. On the
reverse path one of these values is corrupt, for exam-
ple 1001 becomes 1000. The reverse calculation divides
5005 by 1000 which yields the correct result of 5 for the
other operand (assuming integer division). It is clear
that the reverse operation is incomplete as it discards
data; we know that a divide operation has a remain-
der and that this remainder should always be zero. An
exact divisor check was added to the REVTIMES op-
eration.
The remaining ve detection failures were associated
with the STOREINDEX operation which computes the
wrong address. On reversal, REVSTOREINDEX un-
computes the original array index|this involves a di-
vide by four as each integer occupies four bytes. Like
the REVTIMES operation, this divide operation failed
to check that the remainder was zero, so small changes
to the address would not alter the uncomputed index.
This explains the 5 cases where reversal failed to detect
the corruption. A check for exact division was added
to all indexing operations.
The tests were repeated with the exact divisor
checks incorporated in REVTIMES and the indexing
instructions and an extended test was performed us-
ing 58 007 random corruptions. All cases of corruption
were detected. The results are summarised in Table 3.
The exact divisor checks occur at intermediate
points in the calculation and will therefore detect er-
rors that would otherwise be trapped at the input val-
Detection method Number
detected
Percent
detected
REVREF check 20185 34.8
REVLOAD check 11927 20.6
REVTIMES check 12229 21.1
Boolean value check 8251 14.2
CHECK-WORK-VARS 3960 6.8
Comparison (REVGT, etc.) 936 1.6
Exact index check 519 0.9
Total 58007 100.0
Table 3. Fault detection (exact divisor checks)
ues, i.e. by REVREF and REVLOAD. It can be seen
that REVTIMES detects far more than the missing 3%
and there is a matching fall in the number detected by
REVREF.
5. Discussion
5.1. Fail-safe bias
The main intent of this design approach is to de-
tect failures due to systematic design faults rather than
random hardware faults. Normally, random hardware
faults would be revealed by specic hardware checks
(such as memory parity and memory bound limits) and
channel redundancy. Nevertheless the test procedure
makes use of random corruptions and it is encouraging
to note that all 58 007 corruptions were detected by
the method. This was observed even when the tape in-
tegrity check on the \garbage" data was omitted. This
suggests that individual channels will exhibit a high
fail-safe bias of perhaps 99.998% for random internal
failures.
The realism of the fail-safe performance in response
to systematic faults is more debatable, as it depends on
the nature of the postulated fault. In practice the fail-
ures would have to be infrequent otherwise they would
be detected during the normal verication and vali-
dation tests, so the transient corruptions used in the
tests could well be a reasonable representation of the
behaviour of such faults, but it would be desirable to
assess the response to a range of postulated hardware
and compiler faults. Nevertheless the current test re-
sults indicate that the fail-safe bias could be 99.998%
or better.
It could be argued from a theoretical point of view
that any failures due to a single aw in an N-to-N map-
ping should be 100% detectable as the converse map-
ping will still be N-to-N and should expose any failure.
Set against this, there could be faults in the implemen-
tation (such as the omission of the exact divisor check)
which could reduce the achieved level of fail-safe bias.
In practice therefore, a more comprehensive evaluation
is required to support a claim for a high fail-safe bias.
5.2. Run-time overheads
Although the storage and timing overheads are sig-
nicant, reversible computing appears to be a practical
proposition for the straightforward computations found
in safety applications. Other software fail-safety tech-
niques (such as vital coded processing [4]) can involve a
hundredfold increase in execution time, so the tenfold
increase of our technique should not be a major limita-
tion. In addition, the speed could be further improved
by implementing the ARC instruction set in assembler
code or C, and the storage requirements can be further
reduced by reversing specic sub-computations.
5.3. Alternative implementation options
There are many alternative strategies for imple-
menting reversible computing which could be further
explored. For example, the existing implementation
relies on a software comparison of the uncomputed re-
sults. This could be replaced with a fail-safe hardware
checker that maintained a stack of input values and
then compared these with uncomputed values.
It would also be feasible to remove the mirror pro-
gram completely. The program could be implemented
as a sequence of byte codes (similar to the Java virtual
machine), and this could be interpreted by a forward
interpreter and a reverse interpreter which works back
from the end. This is likely to be less ecient than an
explicit mirror program but it would be relatively easy
to implement directly in hardware where the overheads
would be much lower.
It would also be possible to use separate processors
to hold the forward and reverse programs, with the
\garbage values" and nal output values being passed
to the second processor for reversal. The uncomputed
values derived by the reverse processor could then be
compared with the original input values using a hard-
ware comparator. For extra assurance, diverse virtual
machines and computer hardware could be used for the
two processors.
5.4. Functional limitations
It is important to realise that reversible computing
is not a panacea for ensuring fail-safety; it has limita-
tions and the technique should be used in conjunction
with other methods to ensure the safety of the overall
system:
 It only checks the integrity of the low-level in-
structions. Separate methods are needed to en-
sure that the application software performs the
intended function (e.g. through validation, formal
methods, etc.).
 There is no exact reversal for oating point. Any
oating point reversible machine would have to
test if the result was \close" to the original value.
This might be turned to advantage if we are con-
cerned about algorithmic stability; a stable algo-
rithm would have reverse results close to the origi-
nal inputs, while an unstable algorithmwould not.
 There is no protection against faults in the input-
output hardware, so additional input-output in-
tegrity checks are required. For example, di-
verse measurements and application-level credibil-
ity checks could be used.
6. Summary of results
The reversible computing concept looks very promis-
ing. The main technical results of our research study
are that:
1. It is strongly fail-safe and can protect against both
random and systematic faults in the underlying
compiler and processor hardware.
2. The tests performed indicate a fail-safe bias of
better than 99.998%; however this may be over-
optimistic as the tests did not simulate a complete
range of credible systematic faults in the hardware
and compiler.
3. The instruction set is capable of handling quite
complex applications and there is scope for exten-
sion to oating point operations.
4. The approach is generic. The same reversible in-
struction set can be used on many dierent ap-
plications, and the instruction set can be imple-
mented on any computing hardware and compiler
technology.
There are some limitations to the method:
1. A reversible program runs about ten times slower
than a conventional one, but it can be optimised
for higher performance. The same virtual machine
concepts can be readily implemented in other lan-
guages such as C or assembler code, or directly in
hardware.
2. Signicant storage is needed for the \garbage
data" needed for reversal, but exhaustion of the
storage space can be a useful mechanism for de-
tecting runaway programs and timing overruns.
There is considerable scope for further development
of the concept, e.g. hardware support for reversible
computing, extension to oating point, and code gen-
erators to automate the construction of reversible pro-
grams.
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